New Distinctions for Morality and the Law.
Abortion and Political Philosophy
Once we recognize this distinction between the illegal and the immoral, a whole new range of problems opens up, which are covered most thoroughly by Philosopher Alison Jaggar. The Modus Ponens argument we used to divide the issues into two premises presupposed that if we decide that abortion is wrong, then we must outlaw it. Although this might be true in a theocracy, Jaggar says that a liberal democracy “guarantees its citizens the freedom to make moral mistakes, so long as those mistakes do not violate the principles of freedom and justice that guarantee the rights of all” (p. 165) Acknowledging this principle radically changes the shape of the debate. We are no longer considering these problems from the point of view of a single individual deliberating over the right thing to do. We are now asking ourselves questions about what laws would create the best social structures. Our goal is now to imagine a society that would give each individual the best opportunities for making their own choices, rather than deciding which choice is right.
It would be possible to ask these questions about Political and Social Philosophy in purely abstract terms. This is what Plato does in his Republic, and John Rawls does in his A theory of Justice. Jaggar, however, argues that these purely theoretical arguments will not lead to a Just Society if they don’t take into consideration the real world consequences of a society’s laws. Consequently, her arguments involve detailed research about the economic consequences of unwanted pregnancy, the risks to life and health of both pregnancies and illegal abortions, the tendencies of unwanted children to become criminals etc. Many of my students majoring in history, sociology or economics chose this concrete approach for their final papers. I also received many papers describing the traumatic personal experiences of the student’s older relatives, their friends, and even themselves. Papers like these gave me the opportunity to teach skills usually covered in critical thinking classes, such as how to do research, what sort of claims need to be footnoted, and how to make sure that the stories you tell and the facts that you cite actually support the conclusion you are defending.
Once we start considering the social implications of abortion, we must deal with the rights and obligations of people other than the potential mother. Should a hospital require a doctor to perform abortions if she feels they are morally wrong? Do parents have the right to force their daughter to have an abortion, because they believe she is too immature to raise a child? If it is wrong to force a woman or girl to raise a child she doesn’t want, wouldn’t it be equally wrong to force her parents to raise a child that they don’t want? Conversely, is it wrong for parents to force their daughter to have a child if their religious beliefs forbid abortion? Is that significantly different from forcing their child to go to the church of their choice, or not to get a tattoo or ride a motorcycle, or to eat her broccoli?
Does the father of the potential child have any say in this decision? If the conception occurred despite everyone’s best efforts to prevent it, and he never expressed any interest in having the child, and insists now that the mother should not have the child, should he be legally required to provide child support if she decides she wants the child? According to most governments, the answer is “yes”, but that’s not easy to defend from a purely abstract sense of justice. Many pro-choice women defend this by saying things like “he should have been more careful, and now he should pay the price for his carelessness”, until you point out that anti-choice advocates use this same argument to deny the woman the right to choose an abortion. Can we make a meaningful distinction between these two cases, or should we reject this double standard? Jaggar’s arguments for child support rely on heart-wrenching stories to show the limitations of these abstract theories of justice. Sexual relations are often far from being social contracts entered into by autonomous individuals. Often the pregnant woman was young and easily manipulated by fear or charm, and in such circumstances our pity for the victim makes us demand accountability from her seducer. In other cases, however, both parties really are social and emotional equals. In such circumstances, many of us feel that if a woman decides to have a baby against the father’s wishes, she ought to bear sole responsibility for it.
From these examples, we can see that Jaggar’s shift in emphasis leads this discussion into the most fundamental question about the nature of ethics itself. Is ethics based on feelings, as Philosopher David Hume claimed? Or is it based on rights, obligations, and other rational principles of the sort described by the Philosopher Immanuel Kant? If Hume is right, then the tremendous suffering caused by unwanted pregnancies can support a compelling pro-choice argument. But if Kant is right, no effect of suffering or happiness can make an act wrong or right. Instead we must base our judgments entirely on abstract principles of justice, duty and obligation. There is, however an important relationship between these two principles which makes this question more complex than this.
