The Ontology of Abortion: potential, actual and relational properties

Why it’s not OK to kill a sleeping person

If we accept that the right to life requires a particular form of consciousness, and the right physiological structure to embody that form of consciousness, the anti-choice position must retreat to the claim that the right to life must be granted because of a potential property, and not just an actual property. The best argument for this position is probably Don Marquis’ claim that even if it isn’t conscious, a zygote has a right to life because we have no right to deprive it of a future like ours. Some people find his argument compelling, but I don’t think it actually makes sense. If a zygote is not even conscious, how can it be deprived of anything? Only conscious beings can be said to own something, or to be deprived of something they own. As I said in an earlier essay, you can steal a carrot from a farmer, but you can’t steal anything from the carrot itself.

We all agree that the zygote is potentially a person, given the right conditions. However, there are many different kinds of potential properties, and they are always very different from what they actualize. An egg is not a chicken, a match is not a fire, an acorn is not an oak. Why should we conclude that right-to-life consciousness is morally identical to its potential? There are plenty of items in the universe with this same kind of potential, and granting the right to life for any of the others would be absurd. For example, if I drink a…